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I.

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
Question Presented
1. How long can we suspend the Jones Act for port emergencies?
Short Answer
Under current federal law, the Coast Guard does not have the authority to suspend or

waive the Jones Act. The Secretary of Homeland Security has the authority to issue a Jones Act
waiver if she deems it necessary as a matter of national security. The Secretary of the
Department of Homeland Security can issue a waiver on a case by case basis. The duration of the
waiver is determined by the nature of the case, the national security interest at issue, and the
availability of U.S. vessels.
Question Presented
2. What impacts does the Jones Act have on international voyages on the Great Lakes?
Short Answer
The Jones Act has made it difficult for foreign vessels to engage in commerce on the
Great Lakes. The Jones Act prohibits foreign flagged vessels from making stops within U.S.
coastwise trade. It has increased the cost of employing crews on U.S. flag vessels, and has
increased the cost of building U.S. ships. The high cost of building U.S. ships has limited the
amount of vessels available to transport cargo between U.S. ports on the Great Lakes. The Jones
Act as currently applied stifles the ability of the U.S. maritime Great Lakes fleet to take full
advantage of international commerce on the Great Lakes.
Question Presented
3. What changes to either Canadian or U.S. law are necessary to enhance commerce on the
Great Lakes? What impacts would those changes have on the U.S. domestic fleet?
Short Answer
6

The United States and Canada could individually waive their restrictive cabotage
provision in their respective domestic laws to allow each country’s vessel to engage in the
other’s coastwise trade. This would allow the U.S. shipping industry to purchase new
shipbuilding technology from Canada, thereby strengthening the ability of the U.S. domestic
fleet to meet the increasing economic demands of the Great Lakes. Waiving the Jones Act for
Canadian vessels would also allow Canadian flagged vessels to have access to U.S. ports on the
Great Lakes and allow Canadian companies to use bigger U.S. vessels to ship more merchandise
within Canada’s coastwise trade. Both countries would be able to quickly respond to and assist
one another in time of maritime emergency that threatens their national security.
Question Presented
4. What are the limitations on the tug-barge manning requirements?
Short Answer
Under current federal law, the manning requirements for a particular vessel are
determined by the Officer in Charge of Marine Inspection (OCMI) after consideration of the
applicable laws. The current regulation requires only that a tug-barge employ two watchers with
each working a 12-hour shift over a 24-hour period. On the Great Lakes, federal law requires
tug-barge watchers to work a minimum of 8 hours over a 16-hour period. The Jones Act has
severely hampered the ability of tug-barge owner to properly man tug-barges because the cost of
hiring U.S. crew is among the highest in the world. Furthermore, under the current manning
requirements, it is difficult for the Coast Guard to determine whether a tug-barge has a crew that
is well rested and performing the accurate amount of watching hours required by law.
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

7

The rise of the United States as global military and economic power is significantly tied
to the ability of the U.S. maritime industry to produce world-class vessels that are readily
available for commercial and military use. It is difficult to discuss the rise of the U.S. maritime
industry without discussing the Jones Act. In 1920 Congress passed the Merchant Marine Act of
1920; today the act is commonly known as the Jones Act, named after Sen. Wesley Jones (RWash.). Currently, the Jones Act, codified in Title 46 of the United States Code, contains
provisions that enable injured seamen to bring claims against vessels owners for negligence and
for breach of the warranty of unseaworthiness.1
The most controversial provision of the Jones Act relates to the passage of foreign vessels
within the U.S. coastwise trade.2 Federal Regulations provide that a coastwise trade occurs when
a vessel carrying merchandise moves from one U.S. domestic port to another point within the
U.S. The Jones Act provides that no vessel may engage in U.S. coastwise trade unless it is issued
a U.S. coastwise endorsement.3 To qualify for coastwise endorsement, a vessel must be (1) built
in the United States; (2) owned by a U.S. citizen or corporation that is controlled by U.S.
citizens with at least 75 percent U.S. percent ownership; (3) at least 75 percent crewed by U.S.
citizens; and (4) registered in the United States.4 The primary purpose of the restrictive coastwise
provision within the Jones Act is to protect the national security and commercial interest of the

1

46 U.S.C.A. § 30104; See Harbor Tug & Barge Co. v. Papai, 520 U.S. 548 (1997) (discussing

seaman status under the Jones Act).
2

46 U.S.C.A. § 12112

3

Id.

4

46 C.F.R. § 390.3; See Seatrain Shipbuilding Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 444 U.S. 572, 574-75

(1980) (stating that “[t]he Jones Act, has, since 1920, reserved the United States domestic trade
exclusively for vessels built in this country and owned by its citizens”).
8

United States by ensuring that there is an adequate merchant marine, with U.S. flag ships and
trained American sailors to protect foreign trade and to provide support for the armed forces in
times of war or national emergency.5 The U.S. Supreme Court in Seatrain Shipbuilding Corp. v.
Shell Oil Co., 444 U.S. 572, 584 (1980), stated that Congress intended the Jones Act to lead to
the development of a modern and efficient maritime fleet that would be supported by substantial
shipbuilding and repair facilities.”6
U.S. Customs and Border Protection is responsible for enforcing the coastwise provisions
of the Jones Act and it has the authority to impose penalties for violation of the Jones Act.7
Though the Jones Act has substantially promoted the growth of the U.S shipping industry and
provided the U.S. shipbuilding and transportation industry with an outright monopoly over U.S.
coastwise trade, the restrictive provision of the Jones Act has had negative effects on domestic
and international trade. The act has significantly increased the cost of transporting goods
between ports within the Great Lakes and it has significantly inhibited the ability of the United
States Coast Guard to respond to maritime emergency on the Great Lakes.
Powerful voices in Washington and the business sector have expressed opposition to the
restrictive requirements of the Jones Act. In January of 2015, U.S Sen. John McCain (R-AZ)
proposed an amendment to eliminate the provision requiring vessels engaged in coastwise trade

5

Indep. U. S. Tanker Owners Comm. v. Lewis, 690 F.2d 908, 911 (D.C. Cir. 1982)

6

Seatrain Shipbuilding Corp, 444 U.S. 584, supra note 4

7

What Every Member of the Trade Community Should Know About Coastwise Trade:

Merchandise, U.S. CUSTOM AND BORDER PROTECTION (January 2009),
https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/merchandise_3.pdf
9

to be built in the United States.8 According to Sen. McCain, the Jones Act “hinders free trade,
stifles the economy and hurts consumers – largely for the benefit of labor unions.”9 In October
2014, Gregory J. Goff, CEO of Tesoro Corp., the United States largest independent refinermarketers, called on Congress to review the restrictive coastwise provisions of the Jones Act.10
According to Mr. Goff, “the Jones Act makes transporting oil within U.S. coastwise trade two to
three times more expensive than importing oil from the Middle East.”11
There has been no action by Congress or the executive branch to amend or waive
provisions of the Jones Act solely for economic or commercial purposes. However, there is a
provision within the Jones Act that permits the executive branch to waive provisions of the Jones
Act for national defense and national security purposes.
III. DISCUSSION
A. The Jones Act
1. Waiver of the Jones Act
For purposes of national security or national defense, Congress has authorized the
executive branch to issue waiver from compliance with the Jones Act. The waiver can be issued
only under two circumstances: (1) on request by the Secretary of Defense; or (2) on a
determination by the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security – “the agency

8

Floor Statement By Senator John McCain On Amendment to Repel the Jones Act,

MCCAIN.SENATE (Jan. 22, 2015), http://www.mccain.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2015/1/floorstatement-by-senator-john-mccain-on-amendment-to-repeal-the-jones-act;
9

Id.

10

Nick Snow, US Should Reexamine Jones Act, Tesoro’s CEO Recommends, OIL & GAS

JOURNAL (Oct. 02, 2014), http://www.ogj.com/articles/2014/10/us-should-reexamine-jones-acttesoro-s-ceo-recommends..html
11

Id.

10

responsible for the administration of navigation and vessel inspection laws.”12
When the Department of Defense requests a Jones Act waiver, the Department of
Homeland Security is required to issue the waiver for as long as the Secretary of Defense
considers it necessary in the interest of national defense.13 In 2005, the Secretary of Defense
requested a Jones Act Waiver to transport a portion of a sea-based radar system aboard a foreign
vessel within U.S. coastwise trade.14 The request for the waiver was automatically granted by the
Secretary of Homeland Security. A similar waiver was granted in 2006, when the Department of
Defense transported military helicopters from Tacoma, Washington, to Anchorage, Alaska, on a
foreign vessel.15
The Department of Homeland Security can independently issue a Jones Act waiver in the
interest of national security. However, the waiver will be issued only after a determination by the
Maritime Administrator that there are no qualified U.S. flag ships available to meet the national
defense or national security requirement.16 The decision to issue a waiver under the authority of
the Department of Homeland Security has to be made in consultation with the Maritime
Administrator. The Secretary of Homeland Security is required to notify congress of any request
for a Jones Act waiver.17
2. Obtaining a Waiver Based on a Determination by the Secretary of Homeland
Security.

12

46 U.S.C.A. § 501 (b)(1).

13

46 U.S.C.A. § 501(a)

14

Jonathan K. Waldron, How Difficult it is to obtain a Jones Act Waiver? MARINELINK (Nov.

25, 2014), http://www.marinelink.com/news/difficult-obtain-waiver381431.aspx
15

Id.

16

46 U.S.C.A. § 501 (b)(2).

17

46 U.S.C.A. § 501 (b)(3).
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After the Maritime Administrator has determined in consultation with the Secretary of
Homeland Security that there are no available U.S. flag vessels to meet the national defense or
national security interest at issue, the Maritime Administrator is required to identify actions that
could be taken to enable qualified U.S. flag vessels to meet the national defense requirement.18
The determination or conclusion of the Maritime Administrator in itself does not complete the
process for obtaining the waiver. The Maritime Administrator must provide notice of its
determination to the U.S. Custom and Border Protection, the Secretary of Transportation, and the
Secretary of Homeland Security.19 The Maritime Administrator is also required to provide notice
to the public by publishing the information online within 48 hours after the notice of the
determination is provided to the Secretary of Transportation.20
After the determination by the Maritime Administrator is completed, the Secretary of the
Department of Homeland Security must make the final decision to issue a Jones Act Waiver.21 In
addition, the Secretary is required to provide notice to Congress within 48 hours after receiving
the waiver request and within 48 hours after the request is issued.22 The notice to Congress must
provide explanation as to why the waiver is necessary and the reasons why actions could not be
taken to enable qualified U.S. flagged vessels to meet the national defense or national security
interest at issue.23 The Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security generally issue a
waiver only for a limited time, per vessel, and based on the national security or national defense

18

supra note 4.

19

Id.

20

Id.

21

supra note 13.

22

supra note 17.

23

Id.
12

interest at issue at the time the request for a waiver was made.
In Furie Operating Alaska, LLC v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec, Furie sought and
received a waiver from the Secretary of Homeland Security in 2006 to transport a rig from Texas
to Alaska. The waiver was granted based on a determination by the Department of Homeland
Security that there were no qualified U.S. flag vessels that could transport the rig around the
southern tip of South America. The Secretary determined that there was a national security
interest at issue because the rig was needed to help alleviate South Central Alaska's natural gas
shortage, which was affecting defense-related facilities in Alaska.24 However, after the
Department of Homeland Security issued the waiver, Furie was unable to transport the rig in
2006 because of repairs and legal issues unrelated to the waiver request.25 The rig was
subsequently sold to foreign interests, and Furie could no longer use it for natural gas exploration
in Alaska.26 In 2010, Furie made alternate plans to use another foreign vessel to transport the oil
rig to Alaska. Furie filed a request with the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security to
reconfirm the waiver granted in 2006.27 The Secretary did not respond to the request and Custom
and Border Protection informed Furie that the 2006 waiver was no longer in effect and that it
would need a new waiver or penalties would be imposed if the rig was transported on a foreign
vessel.28
Furie filed a subsequent request for a waiver with the Secretary of Homeland Security but

24

Furie Operating Alaska, LLC v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., No. 3:12-CV-00158 JWS, 2015

WL 4076843, at *1 (D. Alaska July 6, 2015)
25

Id.

26

Id at 2.

27

Id.

28

Id.
13

the waiver was denied based on an erroneous determination by the Maritime Administrator that
there were no U.S. owned barges that could transport the rig from Texas to Alaska.29 Furie
transported the rig on a foreign vessel on route to Alasaka, under the assumption that a waiver
would be granted once the Secretary receive the corrected information from the Maritime
Administrator, The Maritime Administrator informed Custom and Border Protection about the
error but the information was not passed on to the Secretary of Homeland Security.30
After learning that Furie was transporting the rig to Alaska on a foreign vessel without a
waiver from the Secretary of Homeland Security, Customs and Border Protection informed Furie
that if the vessel was to complete the journey to Alaska, it would be in violation of § 55102 of
the Jones Act.31 In July 2011, Furie completed the transport of the rig to Alaska and Customs and
Border Patrol imposed a $15 million penalty – the calculated full value of the rig. In July 2015,
Furie filed a complaint alleging that the Secretary of Homeland Security failed to exercise
independent judgment when she denied the waiver request, and that the denial of the waiver was
arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion.32
In rejecting the allegation made by Furie, the Court held that
the decision to grant a Jones Act waiver under § 501(b) is one that is committed to
the Secretary's discretion by law and that discretion is required to be based on a
determination of whether the waiver is necessary in the interest of national
defense—an area of executive action in which courts have long been hesitant to
intrude.33

29

Id. at 3.

30

Id.

31

Id.

32

Id.

33

Id. at 4.
14

The Furie case illustrates that the final decision to issue a Jones Act waiver rests solely with the
Secretary of Homeland Security and a waiver by any other individual or government agency is
not effective. The case also illustrates the wide discretion afforded to the Secretary of Homeland
Security to determine the nature of the national security interest at issue. The case also clearly
exhibits the reluctance of the judiciary to interfere with the determination of the Secretary of
Homeland Security.
3. Authority of the Coast Guard to Unilaterally Waive the Jones Act
Under current federal law, the Coast Guard does not have the authority to waive the Jones
Act without the approval of the Secretary of Homeland Security. In November of 2002, President
George W. Bush signed the Homeland Security Act, reorganizing U.S. governmental agencies to
better respond to foreign and domestic terrorist threats.34 The Homeland Security Act transferred
the U.S Coast Guard from the Department of Transportation to the Department of Homeland
Security.35 As an agency within the Department of Homeland Security, the Coast Guard can
assist in developing a Jones Act waiver request and it can serve as a liaison with the U.S.
Customs staff in support of a request for a Jones Act Waiver.36
In 1989, the Exxon Valdez released over 11 million gallons of oil into the Bligh Reef in

34

Remarks by the President at the Signing of H.R. 5005 the Homeland Security Act of 2002,

WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF PRESS SECRETARY (Nov. 25, 2002), http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/11/20021125-6.html
35

Id.

36

Regional IV Regional Response Team Guidance for Limited Jones Act Waivers during

Pollution Response Actions, U.S. NATIONAL RESPONSE TEAM (Jan. 01, 2003),
http://www.nrt.org/production/NRT/RRTHome.nsf/Resources/OceanDump/$file/2JonesActGuidanceChecklist.doc
15

Alaska, resulting in one of the major oil spill in U.S. history.37 Exxon submitted a request to the
Secretary of Homeland Security to allow foreign oil skimming barges to assist in the cleanup
efforts.38 The Coast Guard supported the waiver request by Exxon, because U.S. flag vessels
were not available to respond to the disaster.39 Similarly, in 2010 the Coast Guard was part of the
National Response Team that responded to the Deep-water Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of
Mexico. The Coast Guard worked with the National Incident Commander to request preemptive
Jones Act waivers to allow a total of seven foreign vessels to move closer to shore should they
need to be evacuated because of severe weather.40 The Secretary of Homeland Security approved
the waivers within 10 days.41
4. Jones Act Waiver for Port Emergency on the Great Lakes
In case of a maritime emergency on the Great Lakes, the Coast Guard could work with
the Department of Defense to request a Jones Act waiver. Such a waiver would be granted
immediately by the Secretary of Homeland Security without a showing that there are no
available U.S. flag vessels. In situations where the Coast Guard need a foreign vessel to help
respond to port emergencies on the Great lakes, the Coast Guard could ask the vessel to submit a
request for a Jones Act waiver and it could support the vessel request for the waiver. If the port

37

supra note 14.

38

Id.

39

Id.

40

Thad W. Allen, National Incident Commander’s Report: MC252 Deepwater Horizon Spill

Response, U.S. Coast Guard National Incident Command (Oct. 1, 2010),
http://www.nrt.org/production/NRT/NRTWeb.nsf/AllAttachmentsByTitle/SA1065NICReport/$File/Binder1.pdf.
41

Id.
16

emergency on the Great Lakes became a national maritime emergency, the Coast Guard could
work with the Federal On-Scene Coordinator to request Jones Acts waivers to enlist the help of
foreign vessels in responding to the emergency, provided that there was a threat to national
security and there were no U.S. flag vessels available to respond to the emergency. In a case
where the obtaining of a waiver may not be feasible to respond to the port emergency on the
Great Lakes, the Coast Guard could enlist the help of foreign vessels with the limitation that the
vessels stay within three nautical miles of U.S. shores. Such an action would not be in violation
of the Jones Act, because Jones Act jurisdiction is limited to three nautical miles off U.S.
shores.42
B. Impact of the Jones Act on International Voyages on the Great Lakes
The shipping routes along the Great Lakes have been in operation for hundreds of years.
The routes were originally established by Native Americans engaged in the fur trade with
networks in Canada and areas around the Great Lakes.43 Today, experts define the Great Lakes
international commercial navigation as “shipping to or from an American or Canadian Great
Lakes port and a country other than the United States or Canada.” 44The vast connection of ports
around the Great Lakes moves cargo from the Great Lakes for international export after exiting
the St. Lawrence Seaway.45 Vessels carrying cargo from one U.S. port on the Great Lakes to

42

National Incident Command MC252-Jones Act Fact Sheet, U.S. COAST GUARD (July 11,

2010), https://www.uscg.mil/foia/docs/DWH/2751.pdf
43

Richard D. Stewart, Ph.D., Great Lakes Marine Transportation System, White Paper Prepared

for the Midwest Freight Corridor Study, GREAT LAKES MARITIME RESEARCH INSTITUTE (2006).
44

Frank Millerd, Global Climate Change and Great Lakes Shipping, Report Prepared for

Committee on the St. Lawrence Seaway, 1-2, WILFRID LAURIER UNIVERSITY (2007).
45

Id.
17

another U.S port must be in compliance with the restrictive coastwise provision of the Jones
Act.46 The Jones Act coastwise restriction has a negative impact on international voyages on the
Great Lakes in that (1) it places U.S. vessels at a competitive disadvantage in international trade;
and (2) it inhibits the ability of the ship building industry on the Great Lakes to build well suited
modern vessels to engage in international commerce and respond to national emergencies on the
Great Lakes.
1. The Jones Act Places the Great Lake Maritime Fleet at a Competitive Disadvantage in
International Commerce.
The Jones Act has impeded the commercial success of the United States’ Great Lakes
maritime fleet. The restrictive coastwise provision of the Jones Act has led to the development of
a Great Lakes fleet that is dependent solely on coastwise domestic commerce and is unable to
substantially benefit from international commerce on or beyond the Great Lakes. The shipping
industry around the Great Lakes was built to serve the commercial interest of states around the
Great Lakes. The United States domestic fleet on the Great Lakes engage only in the
transportation of cargos between states within the Great Lakes.47 American-built vessels on the
Great Lakes are “captive vessels” – vessels that cannot be certified for ocean passage and are too
big to exit the Welland Canal and St. Lawrence Seaway to enter the Atlantic Ocean. 48
Furthermore, the nature of cargo carried by U.S. flag ships on the Great Lakes is primary limited
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to U.S. domestic cargoes of iron ore, coal, limestone, cement, salt, sand, and gravel.49 In contrast
to U.S. flag vessels, Canadian flag vessels on the Great Lakes are able to engage in trade on all
five Great Lakes and are designed to exit the Great Lakes and engage in international commerce
by passage through the Welland Cannal and the St. Lawrence Seaway.50
The absence of U.S. flag vessels’ participation in international commerce on the Great
Lakes has enabled Canadian flag vessels to dominate international commerce on the Great
Lakes. Currently, Canadian flag vessels carry about 36 percent of the dry-bulk cargoes on the
Great Lakes and they account for more than 80 percent of the U.S.–Canada cross-lake trade.51
Canadian flag vessels also account for 92% of international commerce on the Great Lakes and
other foreign vessels account for the remaining 8% of international trade.52 This trend is likely to
continue because the U.S. Great Lakes fleet is unprepared and unable to compete with foreign
vessels for international commerce on the Great Lakes.
2. The Jones Act Inhibits Shipbuilding on the Great Lakes
The restrictive provisions of the Jones Act have increased the cost of shipbuilding on the
Great Lakes and have severely limited the development of a modern Great Lakes maritime fleet
to meet the commercial and national security needs of the United States’ Great Lakes. The
number of large U.S. flag vessels on the Great Lakes has been decreasing over the past 30
years.53 In 1980, there were 140 large U.S. flag dry-bulk vessels on the Great Lakes with a total
carrying capacity of 3,051,307 tons.54 Today there are only 55 U.S. large, dry-bulk U.S.-flag
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vessels with a carrying capacity of 2,035,001 tons.55 Though the number of U.S. flag vessels on
the Great Lakes has been decreasing drastically, there has been no new vessel built over the past
two decades.56 Certainly, there are many reasons as to why a new vessel has not been constructed
to meet the commercial and national security of the Great Lakes; however, it is clear that the
Jones Act shipbuilding restriction has significantly contributed to this delay.
It is widely known that the Jones Act requirements have made it extremely difficult to
construct a vessel on the Great Lakes.57 In Seatrain Shipbuilding Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 444
U.S. 572, 574 (1980), the U.S. Supreme Court noted that “[t]he costs of constructing ships in
American shipyards and manning them with American crews are higher than comparable costs in
foreign ports.”58 Because the Jones Act requires vessels engaged in coastwise trade be
constructed in the United States - including all major parts of the vessel. U.S. shipbuilders have
been unable to take advantage of the low labor and material cost available to their foreign
counterparts.59 The Jones Act prevents U.S. shipbuilders from importing cheaper materials to
construct ships in the U.S. Though there are subsidies available to U.S. shipbuilders, these
subsidies do not level the playing field for American shipbuilders.60 U.S.-owned and U.S-
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crewed vessels still have higher operation costs than Canadian and other foreign vessels.61 It
costs two to three times more to move merchandise on U.S. flag ships within coastwise trade
than it costs to move goods on foreign vessels.62 There is no dispute that the Jones Act protective
measures have enabled the growth of the U.S. maritime industry; however, these same protective
measures are severely inhibiting the ability of the U.S. maritime industry to compete in
international commerce.
C. Changes to U.S. and Canadian Law to Enhance Commerce on the Great Lakes
Generally, the relationship between the United States and Canada on the Great Lakes has
been stable for over a century. In 1909, the parties signed the Boundary Waters Treaty to manage
cooperation on the Great Lakes. The Treaty created the International Joint Commission to serve
as an advisory board to both countries on issues relating to water quantity and water quality
along the boundary between both countries.63 Though both states have shown willingness to
cooperate on environmental and water quality issues on the Great Lakes, there has not been a
similar interest in addressing maritime commercial issues on the Great Lakes.
Like the United States, Canada has cabotage laws that restrict coastwise trade to only
Canadian flag vessels that are crewed with Canadian citizens.64 However, unlike the Jones Act,
Canada’s Coasting Trade Act allows foreign-made vessels to be used in Canadian coastwise
trade provided that they meet the applicable safety regulations and pay the appropriate duties.65
The Canadian Coasting Trading Act also allows foreign citizens to engage in Canadian coastwise
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trade by permitting them to register foreign vessels in Canada and allowing them to form
shipping corporations under Canadian law.66
During the negotiation of the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement, the parties agreed to
remove tariff against Canadians and U.S. built ships engaged in coastwise trade on the Great
Lakes. However, the benefit of this agreement has not materialized for Canada, because the
Jones Act prohibits Canadian-built vessels from engaging in U.S. coastwise trade. During the
negotiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”), Canada tried
unsuccessfully to get the U.S. to agree to a waiver of the Jones Act for Canadian vessels and to
remove the U.S. ownership requirements for vessels engaged in U.S. coastwise trade.67 As a
result of the U.S.’s refusal to waive provisions of the Jones Act, the parties signed NAFTA
excluding the issue of maritime cabotage. However, Canada and Mexico did agree to open their
coastwise trade to vessels carry the flag of the other country. 68
The restrictive cabotage provisions under the Jones Act and the Canadian Coastwise
Trade Act have prevented both states from enjoying the full benefit of commerce on the Great
Lakes. To better enhance commerce on the Great Lakes, it will be in the interest of both states to
waive the restrictive cabotage provisions under their respective domestic laws. Without the
restrictive coastwise provisions, Canadian vessels would be able to take full advantage of the notariff provisions of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, thereby creating opportunity for
Canadian companies to export goods to states on the Great Lakes at a substantially lower cost.
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Furthermore, Canadian companies would also have the opportunity to use bigger U.S. vessels to
ship more goods between Canadian ports.
If some of the coastwise restrictions were waived or removed, the number of vessels
engaging in commerce between U.S. ports would substantially increase, thereby creating more
jobs and revenues for States around the Great Lakes. Removing the coastwise restrictions would
also increase competition on the Great Lakes, thereby reducing the cost of goods for consumers.
Waiving the Jones Act for commerce on the Great Lakes would also allow the U.S to
upgrade its aging Great Lakes fleet by allowing U.S. shipbuilders to purchase shipbuilding and
repair materials at substantially lower cost from outside the United States. The waiver would also
increase competition between U.S. and Canadian vessels, thereby providing an incentive for the
Great Lakes maritime fleet to build vessels that are capable of engaging in domestic and
international commerce on and beyond the Great Lakes. Waiving the Jones Act provision would
also enable both states to work together to quickly respond to maritime emergency on the Great
Lakes, by making available additional vessels to respond to maritime emergencies that threaten
the national security interest of both states.
D. Jones Act Limitation on Tug-barge Manning Requirements
The Jones Act has hampered the ability of U.S. vessel owners to hire adequate numbers
of crew to man U.S. flag vessels. Under current manning restrictions, tug-barge are required to
have a minimum of two watchers when at sea and engaged on a voyage of less than 600 miles.69
Each watcher is required to work a maximum of 12 hour shift over a 24 hour period, except in
cases of emergency.70 Tug-barges on the Great Lakes are also required to have two watchers but
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the watchers are only required to work a maximum of 8 hours over a 15 hour period.71 The duty
to ensure that a tug-barge is properly manned with the appropriate watchers rests on the owner,
charterer, managing operator, master, or individual in charge.72 Because the manning
requirements for a particular vessel may sometime require more than two watchers, the law
requires the Officer in Charge of Maritime Inspection to make the final determination for the
manning requirements for a particular vessel in consideration of the size and type of vessel,
installed equipment, proposed routes of operation including frequency of port calls, cargo
carried, type of service in which employed, degree of automation, use of labor saving devices,
and the organizational structure of the vessel.73
Failure to properly man a vessel or a tug-barge may endanger the safety of the crew and
cargo. In Union Oil Co. of California v. M/V Point Dover, 756 F.2d 1223, 1229 (5th Cir. 1985),
the Court stated that the vessel must be manned with a competent crew, and a deficiency in
manning that has a causal connection to the damages is significant in determining the liability of
the owner for the damages.74 Furthermore, failure to properly man a vessel could subject the
vessel to unseaworthiness, thereby making the owner vulnerable to liability for violations of the
Jones Act warranty of seaworthiness. The seaworthiness of a vessel means that the vessel is fit in
all respects to cope with conditions it is likely to encounter at sea, including the competency of
the crew.75 In Matter of Ta Chi Navigation (Panama) Corp., S.A., 513 F. Supp. 148, 157-58
(E.D. La. 1981), the court held that a ship could be held liable for unseaworthiness if the owner
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fails to make the vessel seaworthy by ensuring that the vessel is properly manned.76
Having a properly manned vessel is not limited to having the required number of
engineers, watchers or other members of the crew. Under the International Maritime
Organization Resolution A.772(18), the vessel must also have a crew that is well rested.77 Under
the current manning requirements, it is difficult for the Coast Guard to determine whether a tugbarge has a crew that is well rested or performing watching duties, because the Coast Guard is
not on the vessel when it is on voyage.
The Jones Act contributes significantly to the manning issue, because it requires that all
vessels be crewed by U.S. citizens.78 The cost of hiring U.S. crew is among the highest in the
world.79 To reduce the cost of crew, many companies have reduced the number of deck officers
from three to two on vessels under 200 gross tons.80 In regards to tug-barges, some tug owners
have eliminated their deck crews and rely on engineers and the cook to handle watching duties.
These types of actions are likely to result in vessels that are manned by overworked and fatigued
crew members. Furthermore, a crew that is undermanned, overworked, and fatigued makes the
vessels unseaworthy and highly susceptible to collisions and other maritime emergencies.
Removing the U.S. crew requirement would force U.S. citizens to compete with other
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legal workers for jobs on U.S. vessels. The increased competition from qualified workers who
are not U.S. citizens would force the trade unions to reduce the cost of crew thereby enabling
U.S. vessels to hire more crew to man vessels at an affordable price. To enforce the tug-barge
manning requirements, the U.S. Coast Guard could conduct frequent unannounced boarding of
tug-barges on voyage, to ensure that they are properly manned with a competent crew. The Coast
Guard could also increase the fine or penalty that comes with violating the tug-barge manning
requirements.
IV.

CONCLUSION
The Jones Act remains a significant milestone in the United States’ maritime history. It

ignited the rise of the United States as a global maritime power, and it continues to provide jobs
for thousands of U.S. citizens around the Great Lakes. However, times have changed and the
world is more economically competitive than it was when the Jones Act was enacted. The U.S.
maritime industry is competing with not only Canada, but with China for control of global
maritime commerce. The U.S. cannot maintain its edge over global maritime commerce when
its competitors are building new vessels faster, and at a substantially lower cost. The U.S’s
maritime industry cannot effectively compete in global maritime commerce when the cost of
shipping goods on U.S. vessels is substantially higher than the cost of shipping goods on foreign
made vessels. It would be in the economic interest of the United States to amend or waive the
Jones Act restrictive coastwise provisions to enable the U.S. maritime industry to compete
effectively in global maritime commerce.
In light of the ageing Great Lakes maritime fleet and the high cost of building vessels in
the U.S., it would be appropriate to waive the U.S. build requirement of the Jones Act to permit
the Great Lakes shipping industry to purchase affordable foreign vessels. Waiving the U.S.
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build requirement would also allow the Great Lakes shipping industry to purchase foreign parts
to build U.S. vessels that are affordable and able to exit the St. Lawrence Seaway, thereby
enabling the shipping industry along the Great Lakes to effectively compete with Canada for
international commerce on the Great Lakes.
In matters of national security arising out of port emergencies, the Jones Act waiver
process should be streamlined to ensure that the Coast Guard and the National Response Team
would be able to immediately enlist the help of foreign vessels if necessary. The Secretary of
Homeland Security should be able to issue a Jones Act waiver without having to verify whether
there are qualified U.S. vessels available. Amending the Jones Act would not weaken our
maritime industry, but rather, it would be another milestone in ensuring that the United States
has a well capable maritime fleet that can compete and protect our national security interests in
light of recent changes in international maritime commerce.
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